Availability of Firms' Information and their Choice of External Credit : Evidence from the Data of Small Firms by Watanabe, Wako
Discussion Paper No. 616 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AVAILABILITY OF FIRMS’ INFORMATION AND 
THEIR CHOICE OF EXTERNAL CREDIT: 
EVIDENCE FROM THE DATA OF  
SMALL FIRMS 
 
 
Wako Watanabe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
September 2004 
 
 
The Institute of Social and Economic Research 
Osaka University 
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan 
Availability of Firms’ Information and their
Choice of External Credit: Evidence from the
Data of Small Firms∗
Wako Watanabe
Osaka University†
First draft: September 2003
This version: September 2004
Abstract
The main purpose of this paper is to present the empirical findings derived from
the data of small firms that the availability of private and public information on the
borrowing firm leads to diverse borrowing patterns among firms. Exploring logit
models to characterize the firm’s choice of a financial source, we find that firms whose
information is poorly recorded, or who are publicly less recognized, are more likely to
choose institutional lending over trade credit but as the recorded information becomes
more organized and firms become more transparent, they tend to graduate to a greater
use of trade credit.
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1 Introduction
This paper intends to provide the empirical answer to the question: “Why do specialist fi-
nancial intermediaries who engage solely in financial services exist?”. The relevant answers
have been addressed concerning banks that are the largest subset of specialist financial in-
termediaries.1 Freixas and Roche (1997) name four roles of a bank: offering access to a
payment system, transforming assets (for instance, transforming of terms of assets), manag-
ing risk (of the investment project), and processing information and monitoring borrowers.
They place emphasis on the fourth role, of managing asymmetric information, which, they
claim, has been the major theoretical contribution of the last 20 years to our understanding
of the banking function. They explain:
(I)t is reasonable to assume that banks have a specific part to play in managing
some of the problems resulting from imperfect information on borrowers. Banks
may invest in an informational technology that allows them to screen the different
demands for loans they are confronted with and to monitor the projects, thus
limiting the risk that the borrower may implement a project different from the
one agreed upon initially.
Thus, the contemporary banking theory of asymmetric information restates the funda-
mental but vague question into the more manageable question: “Are specialist financial
intermediaries more advanced (efficient) in processing information (on borrowers) and mon-
itoring borrowers than other competing lenders that provide funds to the same customers?”
We know that the recent development of financial instruments allow various unintermediated
financial instruments to fulfill transformation of assets and risk management. If specialist
intermediaries lack informational advantages, the size of institutional loans must be negli-
gible and only as large as that of the pooled funds required for the settlement of payment
needs. The size of institutional loans in the real world, however, certainly exceeds this
magnitude.
Small firms have been characterized as being bank dependent for their external financing
as they are blocked from access to unintermediated financial markets. Trade credit, on the
other hand, has been analyzed rather as non-financial business practice among firms. In
fact, however, trade credit can be viewed as a form of short term credit granted by firms
supplying goods and services to buyer firms, and interestingly small firms are almost equally
trade credit dependent as well as bank dependent. 43 percent and 37 percent of small firms’
liability are trade credit and institutional borrowing, respectively. An analysis of small
1It is not our intention to restrict the interpretation of our empirical findings to only banks since such
specialist intermediaries include non-bank financial companies too.
1
firms’ financial decision must consider their liability management of two largest items. This
approach also allows us comparison of financial institutions as specialist lenders with trade
credit providing firms as non-specialist lenders.
Using the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) we investigated the relation-
ship of the informational characteristics of small firms and the pattern of their borrowing
demand. In particular we explored how the managerial and accounting information of the
firms is recorded and made available to the lenders and how the openness of the managerial
decision making process, and the firms’ public recognition lead to different borrowing pat-
terns among them. We modeled the firm’s borrowing application behavior with a discrete
choice econometric model. Use of data on firms’ applications for loans and trade credit,
which include data on denied loans, allows us to identify borrowing demand and is superior
to the conventional use of balance sheet data that are themselves only a collection of agreed
contracts matching lending demand and supply.
Our main findings are: 1. Informationally opaque and less publicly known young firms
are more likely to choose institutional loans over trade credit; 2. They tend to switch to a
greater use of trade credit besides institutional loans as they become more established and
publicly known, and are more forthcoming in recording detailed and accurate information on
their management and accounting. Such findings support the notion of the informational
advantage of institutional lenders.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background
of our empirical exercise. While reviewing the related theoretical and empirical literature,
it explains the contractual characteristics of trade credit and distinguishes it from the in-
stitutional lending based on its informational structure. Section 3 describes the data and
introduces the empirical method. Section 4 shows and interprets the results. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Background and the Related Literature
2.1 The Costly State Verification Model
The costly state verification model (Townsend [1979], Williamson [1987], Bernanke, Gertler
and Glichrist [1999]) shows that the lender’s offer on the terms of contract reflects the cost
that the lender expends to verify the state of the project the borrower firm exercises.2 Since
2The model assumes that the return of the firm’s project is the private information to the firm without
the lender’s monitoring. Unless the lender exercises costly ex-post monitoring, upon the borrower’s default,
he cannot know whether the borrower firm cheats the lender when the invested project is indeed successful
or he truthfully reports that the project fails.
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the higher cost of monitoring compresses the lender’s expected profit from lending at any
lending rate, the offering rate has to be forced up to make up for such loss of profit. The
more efficient monitoring allows the lender to offer the cheaper funds to the firm. The firm
compares contractual conditions that he would agree on with possible lenders and chooses
the most favorable lender.
The size of the monitoring cost varies across lender-borrower pairs. It depends on the
lender’s monitoring technology, the borrower firm’s transparency and public recognition,
and the lender’s special knowledge and expertise regarding the firm. Financial institutions
staffed by competent and experienced auditing officers and equipped with the appropriate
rating program can audit any firm more efficiently than those not so prepared. Any lender,
regardless of its monitoring efficiency, can audit more transparent and more publicly known
firms with greater ease than it can more opaque and less publicly recognized ones. Lenders
who specialize in specific industries or those who have special relationships with certain
borrowing firms and have access to hard to obtain information take advantage of overseeing
such industries and firms more efficiently than other lenders.
Since the higher lending rate has two opposing effects on the lender’s expected profit—
a higher return upon the firm’s success and an increased likelihood of the borrower firm’s
default—the lender’s expected profit does not necessarily increase monotonically in the lend-
ing rate. Thus, the profit maximizing lender does not intend to increase lending supply
monotonically in the lending rate, either. If the lending demand is sufficiently high, the
supply and demand curves will not necessarily intersect, thus, leading to the Williamson’s
(1987) equilibrium credit rationing.3
2.2 Small Business Finance and Trade Credit
Before further developing the discussion on the theoretical background, we shift our focus
briefly to the reality of small business finance. The major sources of external finance by
small firms are institutional lenders, mostly so-called relationship lenders, and trade credit, a
medium of short term credit.4 Trade credit is a major alternative to institutional borrowing
for small firms that are restricted access to unintermediated finance. The data in the 1998
SSBF show that 66 percent of small firms that employ less than 500 people use trade credit
3Williamson (1987) shows the interesting case of a backward bending lending supply curve with a unique
maximum supply of loans. In this case attainment of equilibrium credit rationing is ensured given a
sufficiently high lending demand.
4Neither equity finance nor bond finance is visible presumably because of the small amount of external
funds needed. Bolton and Freixas (2000a, 2000b) argue that the only option available to the riskiest start-
ups is equity finance. It appears that such firms in the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) do
not issue equity publicly but either the owner, his family, or his acquaintances provide additional equity if
it is needed.
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and on average 43 percent of the total credit owed by the firms is trade credit.5 Indeed both
figures exceed the corresponding figures on relationship lending (44 percent and 37 percent).
Trade credit is a type of lending contract made between non-financial firms. A supplier
firm of goods and services allows a buyer to defer the payment. The lag between the date
of delivery of goods or services rendered and the date of payment means that the credit is
granted by the supplier firm to the buyer firm.
There are two types of a trade credit contract. A complex two-part terms contract has
four components: the discount rate, the discount due date, the net due date, and the penalty
rate. These four components are set up so that the buyer is given an incentive to repay at
the earlier time. The buyer firm is offered a one to two percent discount on sold goods if it
pays within a shorter period of time. Thus missing the discount due date would require the
buyer an expensive opportunity cost.6 Further down the road, if the buyer fails to pay by
a certain date called the net due date, the buyer is in default and a penalty rate is imposed
on him. However, if as the buyer firm makes its remittance by the discount due date, the
credit is cost free. A typical two-part terms contract structure is depicted in Figure 1. The
discount is not offered under a net contract. The rest of its contractual structure is the
same as that of a two-part terms contract.7
2.3 Specialist and Non-specialist Intermediaries
Unlike the conventional empirical works that intend to examine advantages of relationship
lenders over non-relationship lenders, our empirical interest is in the relative advantage of
the specialist financial intermediary, who is engaged solely in financial business, over the
non-specialist, who is engaged in both financial and non-financial activities.8 Institutional
5A detailed description of the SSBF survey and the descriptive statistics on the survey data will appear
in section 4.
6Under the typical contract with 10 days as the discount due date, 2 percent as the discount rate, and
30 days as the net due date, missing the discount due date would require the buyer to pay an annual 43.9
percent of opportunity cost, what we call the implicit interest rate.
The implicit interest rate ri is calculated according to the following formula.
ri =
µ
100
100− rd
¶ 360
NET−DIS
− 1
where rd is the discount rate, NET is the number of days from the date of derivery to the net due date,
and DIS is the number of days to the net due date.
7For the detailed discussion on trade credit contract, see Ng, Smith, and Smith (1999). They discuss
that a choice between two types of contracting form gives suppliers a greater flexibility in offering terms of
contract though suppliers do not vary prices (interest rates) much across buyers within an industry (Petersen
and Rajan ([1994], [1997]).
8The supplier - buyer relationship can be as long lasting and strong as the lender - borrower relationship.
So many of supplier firms providing trade credits can be also relationship lenders. The literature review
4
lenders and trade credit providing firms are good real world examples of specialists and non-
specialists respectively. Bond (2004) discusses that the specialist emerges when the total
aggregate monitoring costs in the economy are reduced with the intermediary rather than
without. According to his discussion trade credit is a more efficient form of financial inter-
mediation than institutional lending, all other things being equal. Since the non-specialist
intermediary does not have to monitor itself, intermediation by the non-specialist reduces
the aggregate costs of monitoring in comparison to the intermediation by the specialist.
Figure 2 depicts the specialist intermediation and the non-specialist intermediation in
a simple environment with only two borrowing firms (entrepreneurs). The non-specialist
intermediary has to monitor only one entrepreneur whereas the specialist intermediary has
to monitor and verify both entrepreneurs, and hence the total (aggregate) monitoring costs
are higher with the non-specialist intermediary if the unit monitoring cost is the same for
both the specialist and the non-specialist. Therefore the specialist intermediary emerges
only when it is substantially more advanced in monitoring borrowers than the non-specialist.
2.4 Monitoring Technology and Transparency
It is the commonly held conventional wisdom that the advanced monitoring technology of the
specialist lender allows it to audit opaque firms with obscure accounting and management
records as easily as it can transparent firms with higher quality of written records.9 A
specialist lender equipped with better monitoring capability is able to offer funds to a viable
firm whose written documents on accounting and management are poorly recorded more
cheaply than a non-specialist. For instance, the advanced monitor has informal access
through its close contacts with the manager to information that is not recorded in either
the hard copy or electronic files. Unlike recorded hard information such soft information is
hard to obtain without expertise and special knowledge.
However, the opposite scenario is also easily justifiable. The efficient lender could be
good at processing and analyzing the recorded information rather than extracting the soft
information through informal activities.10 Therefore a specialist lender offers cheaper funds
to firms with better management and accounting records. On the other hand, a non-
specialist lender is indifferent to firms regardless of availability of information on them,
since the recorded information, which would be useful for the advanced auditor to judge
will appear in section 2.5.
9This point is particularly made in the relationship lending literature. For the relationship lending theory,
see Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) and Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002).
10For instance Petersen and Rajan (2002) discuss that the historically observed widening distance of the
(specialist) lender and the borrower is likely to reflect the fact that detailed hard information is easily
obtainable electronically thanks to the rapid development of information technology.
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the firm’s solvency and viability, and to verify the firm’s default, is nothing but a blank
paper. Therefore the superior auditor charges a higher interest premium against opaque
firms, whereas the inferior auditor provides funds to them at the same cost as the funds to
more transparent borrowers.
In reality both cases must coexist. It is, therefore, an empirical question as to which
case is more of relative importance. If the former dominates the latter, we observe that
the more opaque small firm chooses institutional lending (a specialist) over trade credit (a
non-specialist), and vice versa.
2.5 Empirical Literature
There are relatively few empirical works that attempt to relate the firms’ financial decisions
or the cost of lending directly to their informational characteristics. Based on the Duffie and
Lando (2002) model of the credit spreads of bonds issued by firms with imperfect account-
ing and using the percentile ranking of the firm’s transparency of accounting information
calculated from the data published by the Association for Investment and Management Re-
search, Yu (2004) finds that the spread attributable to the extent of the bond issuing firms’
accounting imperfection is positive and statistically significant.
The closely related work attempting to examine the influence of the firm’s informational
characteristics on the cost of borrowing is Petersen and Rajan (2002). Interpreting that the
geographical closeness to the borrower firm implies better monitoring, with 1987 and 1993
SSBF surveys, they estimate the effect of the distance predicted by the firm’s informational
characteristics on the probability that the institutional lender accepts the application and the
contractual lending rate, and find that the effect has become less important. They discuss
that the ease with which the lender can now acquire the borrower information through the
development of information technology does not require the direct contact that the physical
closeness allowed in the past. Using Argentine data on banks and small firms Berger,
Klapper, and Udell (2001) find that large foreign owned firms, whose decisions on lending
are likely to be made at their headquarters physically far from the small firms, are more
inclined to supply loans to small firms in a period of financial distress than would small
domestic banks. With 1987 SSBF data Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that an older firm
is charged the lower interest rate on the most recently accepted loan. As a related area
of study there are a large number of works examining the role of the relationship in small
business finance.11
11With 1987 data Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that the length of the relatiionship does not have
significant negative effect on the interest rate charged on the most recently accepted loans, whereas Berger
and Udell (1995) with the same data find the negative effect of the length of relationship on the premium
over prime rate for loans issued under lines of credit. With 1993 data Cole (1998) examines the effect of pre-
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Petersen and Rajan (1997) extrapolate from 1987 SSBF data that the demand for trade
credit measured by the accounts payable over assets increases with the firm’s age, and de-
creases in the length of a relationship with a financial institution, suggesting that an older
firm uses less institutional lending and replaces its financial needs with trade credit. Pe-
tersen and Rajan (1994) also find that the use of trade credit measured by the percentage
of trade credits that were paid after the due date and the negative of discounts taken by the
borrowing firm decreases as firms age and is higher for a corporation. However, to the best
of our knowledge there is not a single paper that directly examines the role of informational
characteristics on the small firm’s choice of external credit from trade credit and institutional
lending, two of equally important financial sources for small firms.
3 Data and Empirical Methodology
3.1 Data Description
The Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) is conducted by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System and collects information on for-profit, non-financial, non-farm,
non-subsidiary business enterprises in the United States that have fewer than 500 employees.
The information collected includes the firm’s legal origin, various owner characteristics such
as age, education, management experience, ownership concentration, the firm’s geographical
expansion, firm age, use of financial services, the firm’s relationships with financial institu-
tions, and the firm’s income and balance sheets. The SSBF has provided the most reliable
data set on the management and financial information of small firms, and is widely used by
economics and finance researchers.12
The 1998 survey is the third in a series of surveys along with the 1987 and 1993 surveys.
The number of firms surveyed was 3,561. Reflecting the development of information tech-
nology in the late 1990s, the 1998 survey collects data on the firm’s use of computers for
business purposes. This allows us to construct the more appropriate variable that captures
how well hard information on the firm’s accounting and management is recorded. Previous
surveys have asked the firm what types of written records the firm uses, if there are any in
existing relationships such as the firm’s possession of deposit accounts and the length of relationship on the
lender institution’s probability to extend the existing contract and find the significant effect of relationship
variables. Degryse and Cayseele (1999) using the large Belgian contract level data on bank lending to small
firms find that the length of relationship and the main bank reduces the contractual lending rate. Hoshi,
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) find that the Japanese firms in a keiretsu corporate group, who are expected
to have close ties to the main bank in the group, are more insulated from liquidity shocks in their investments
than firms not affiliated with a keiretsu.
12The complete set of works that use the SSBF are available on the web page of the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/oss/oss3/abstract.html.
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answering the survey. Such information may serve as a proxy for the state of maintenance of
information, but it is not a direct measure. It may be that the firm with very good written
records simply did not have the records within the respondent’s reach. In this case, use of
written records does not have economic meaning on the firm’s business operation.
3.2 Econometric Model
We model the small firm’s external financial demand as the firm’s discrete choice of financial
sources. The survey questionnaires of the SSBF include the firm’s recent applications for
items in liabilities. The advantage of using data on applications rather than post contract
financial statements data is that one can identify the firm’s demand from a certain financial
source no matter if the application from such a source is granted or not. Firms unsuccessful
in their credit applications have a credit demand but do not show it as a liability on their
own balance sheets.
We assume that the small firm decides whether to apply to institutional lending or not
and whether to apply to trade credit or not.13 Under this assumption there are four states
in one of which any given firm falls: no demand for trade credit or of institutional lending
(no demand of external credit); only trade credit; only institutional lending; and both trade
credit and institutional lending. Each firm chooses one of these financing alternatives
depending on its informational and demographic characteristics. We employ probabilistic
choice models discussed in Amemiya (1985) to characterize the firm’s choice. More precisely,
we estimate the following conditional probability that the firm i chooses a financial source
(mix) j.
Pij = Pr(di = j | xi), j = 0, 1, 2, and 3
di is the dichotomous variable that takes on values 1 if the firm i has no external credit
demand, 2 if it applies to only trade credit, 3 if it applies to only institutional lending, and 4
if it applies to both trade credit and institutional lending. One widely used functional form
for the conditional expectation Pij is the logit family. Its mathematical simplicity allows
us to estimate the model parameters relatively easily. The models can be derived from the
optimal choice of the source of external credits by the firm. Denoting Uij as the firm i’s
utility from choosing the financial source j and J = {0, 1, 2, 3} we get,
Pij = Pr (Uij > Uik,∀k ∈ J\j | xi) , j = 0, 1, 2, and 3
We further assume that Uij =xiβ
∗
j+εij so that the firm’s utility is composed of a determin-
13Other alternatives for external finance by small firms are almost non-existent in the data.
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istic part attributable to the firm j’s various characteristics and the stochastic disturbance.
We assume that there are k variables that capture the firm’s characteristics so that xi is a
1× k column vector. The logit family specifies the (joint) distribution function of εij to be
(the function of) the extreme value function given by exp [− exp (−εij)].
We examine three specifications: the multinomial logit model; the nested logit model;
and the nested multinomial logit model. Their differences are based on assumptions made
on the structure of the decision making. It is likely the case that only firms in need of
external credits proceed to the decision of choosing one of the three alternative external credit
sources. That is, the firm must decide at first whether or not to apply for external credits
at all regardless of any specific source, and then choose only trade credit, only institutional
lending, or both of them. The three specifications differ in the way they deal with such a
structure of the decision making process. 14
Multinomial logit model
The multinomial logit model does not take into account the firm’s two-stage sequential
decision. (the first figure of Figure 3) The firm chooses one of all four alternatives simulta-
neously. The model then assumes the independence of stochastic disturbance εij across any
alternative j.
One can derive the probability that firm i chooses an alternative j as the function of
indices xiβl’s as,
Pji =
exp
¡
xiβj
¢
1 +
3P
l=1
exp (xiβl)
, j = 0, 1, 2, and 3, β0 = 0
Note that one cannot identify all parameter vectors for four different states. We can
only identify the difference of the parameter vector for the comparison group (β∗0) and each
of the remaining three βj = β
∗
j − β∗0 .
Nested multinomial logit model
In the nested multinomial model the two-stage nature of the firm’s decision making
process is explicitly imposed. The firm decides whether to borrow or not before choosing
the specific source of credits. (the second figure of Figure 3) The decision tree for the nested
multinomial logit model is portrayed in the second figure of Figure 3. One can write the
(unconditional) probability of not borrowing and the conditional probability of choosing the
source j respectively with parameters β and γj’s as,
P0i = Pr (di = 0) =
1
1 + exp (xiβ)
14For a formal derivation of models, see Amemiya (1985).
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Pr (di = j | di 6= 0) =
exp
¡
xiγj
¢
1 +
2P
l=1
exp (xiγl)
15
Nested logit model
The nested logit model is the most general model of the three.16 It allows correlation
among the firm’s utilities from different sources of external credits but does not impose
the explicit two-stage decision structure. (the third figure of Figure 3) One obtains the
unconditional probability that the firm i does not apply to any of external credits Pi0 and
the probability of choosing an external credit source j conditional on that the firm i does
apply to one of three external credit sources respectively as,
P0i =
1
1 + a
½
3P
l=1
exp (ρ−1xiβl)
¾ρ
P2ji = Pr (di = j | di 6= 0) =
exp
¡
ρ−1xiβj
¢
3P
l=1
exp (ρ−1x0iβl)
, j = 1, 2, and 3
where the subscript 2 represents the second stage, and ρ and a are model parameters. In
particular, ρ is the correlation parameter. 17
Marginal effects
We estimate these models by the maximum likelihood estimation. In non-linear discrete
choice models coefficient vectors themselves are of little interest to us unlike in linear models
in which coefficients themselves are marginal effects of changes in independent variables
on the dependent variable. We are interested in either levels of the unconditional and
second stage conditional probabilities per se for a certain value for a vector of characteristics
variables xi or the effect of marginal change in a certain variable in the vector xi on the
probabilities (the marginal effect).
The marginal effect on the unconditional probability is given by ∂ Pr(di=j)∂xmi for a con-
tinuous variable xm. The marginal effect for a binary (dummy) variable xm0 given by
15Note, Pr(di = j) = Pr (di = j | di 6= 0)Pr (di 6= 0) = exp(xiβ)1+exp(xiβ)
exp(xiγj)
1+
2P
l=1
exp(xiγl)
16Nested multinomial logit and multinomial logit models are special cases of the nested logit model.
17The unconditional probability of choosing an alternative j (6= 0) can be obtained by Pji = Pr (di 6= 0)
Pr (di = j | di 6= 0) = (1− P0i)P2ji. The formula degenerates to the formula for the multinomial logit
model if ρ = a = 1. β1 = 0 and ρ = 1 in the second equation of the formula result in the formula for the
second stage multinomial logit model in the nested multinomial logit model.
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Pr (di = j) |xm0i=1 − Pr (di = j) |xm0i=0, represents the associated change in the probability
with a change of the m0th variable from 0 to 1. The marginal effects for the conditional
probability are analogous. Since these marginal effects are the functions of xi, one needs
to compute the sample average to evaluate the effects numerically. In calculating the effect
of each single variable for each observation, which is then used for averaging over all the
observations, other variables are kept at the original value of the observation.18 19
3.3 Variables
Dependent variable
Use of the data on the firm’s applications of loans and trade credit that include rejected
these attempts allows us to identify lending demand and is superior to the conventional use
of balance sheet data that are themselves only a collection of agreed contracts matching
lending demand and supply.
Regarding institutional lending, the SSBF asks not only how many times the firm applied
for new loans but also if there were times when the firm needed credit but did not apply
because it thought the application would be turned down. Since the firm that did not apply
for loans for fear of being rejected by the institution can be interpreted to have had demand
for loans, we should include both actual applications and voluntary withdrawals.20 Table
1 shows the descriptive statistics on the variables used to construct the dependent variable
and the dependent variable itself.
It appears that quite a few firms withdrew voluntarily from applying for a loan (22
percent) and a majority of them (63 percent) never applied for a loan afterward. Among
the firms that applied for the loan afterward, 60 percent of them were never successful in
any of their applications. Thus only 15 percent of firms that had ever withdrawn from
application fearing rejection were indeed accepted by some lenders in the end. Among firms
that had applied for a loan at least once, most of them (83 percent) obtained loans eventually
and half of the firms who were successful at least once stopped submitting applications with
their first successful application. Roughly speaking, there are two model groups within firms
demanding institutional lending. The first group of firms do not even attempt applying for a
loan and withdraw voluntarily in the last three years. The second group searches around for
18As each probability is a non-linear function of xiβl’s, the marginal effect for each variable is not a
function of only a coefficient for the variable of interest itself but a function of all parameters including
parameters for other alternatives and other model parameters if they are modeled so. Thus neither the
statistical significance nor the insignificance at any given significance level of a coefficient in the linear index
of the model xiβl does not say much about the statistical significance of the marginal effect.
19In estimating standard errors of marginal effects, the standard delta method is used.
20Petersen and Rajan (2002) employ the same approach to define firms that were rejected loan applications.
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lenders until they are successful, then stop shopping. The mode of the number of demands
for institutional lending within a three-year period is 1.21
Regarding trade credit, the SSBF asks both use of trade credit and experiences of rejection
of trade credit by a supplier firm in the last one year period. Two thirds of firms used trade
credit, whereas only 1 percent of firms had been denied and never had trade credit in the
one year period.22
We construct the dependent variable by combining the data on the application to insti-
tutional lending and on use of trade credit and arranges firms into four groups, firms without
demand for external credits (21 percent), firms demanding only trade credit (38 percent),
firms demanding only institutional lending (11 percent), and firms demanding both trade
credit and institutional lending (30 percent).
Though the period of time during which institutional lending is surveyed is much longer
(three years) than that for trade credit (one year), combining both sets of data does not
cause serious problems since firms are almost split between those using trade credit and
those not using it, and this division among firms seems to be a steady state phenomenon.
Firms that used trade credit in the survey year are very likely to have used trade credit in
the previous two years, too, whereas those that did not in the year are not very likely to
have stopped use of trade credit all of a sudden after two years of trade credit use. This is
a reasonable assumption also because use of trade credit is a high frequency event and not
an event which takes place only once or twice in three years. Indeed firms that use trade
credit on average used trade credit for 72 percent of all purchases they made.
Independent variables
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of independent variables that are meant to mea-
sure the firm’s informational characteristics.
RECORD is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the respondent used some
kind of written records to answer the survey questionnaires and 0 if he/she relied on his/her
memory. If the firm keeps the written records in an organized manner, they must be readily
available to the firm’s manager (respondent). Well organized records must also be more
informative to outside lenders. Seventy nine percent of firms used some kind of written
records.23
21The SSBF investigates the decomposition of institutions to determine which firms made their most
recent approved and denied applications separately. 91.8 percent of approved and 88.4 percent of denied
applications were made to depository institutions. This means that in analyzing the sample of small firms
institutional lending and bank lending are almost synonymous. The decomposition of institutional lenders
to which firms withdraw without an actual attempt is not available in the survey, but it appears reasonable
to assume that such firms consider applying mostly to banks as well.
22The low rejection rate of applied trade credit suggests that it is unlikely that large number of firms
withdraw applying to credit voluntarily.
23It may be the case that the respondent simply did not use the written records to answer the survey
12
PCFMAN is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the firm uses computers for
its accounting. Use of computers for accounting would leave more accurate records of the
firm’s accounting information. As we described earlier, this variable is new in the 1998 data
and our primary interest in estimating discrete choice models. Seventy percent of firms use
computers for accounting.
RECORD and PCFMAN are meant to be direct measures of availability of hard infor-
mation to lenders. Besides, two additional variables are included as indirect proxies. They
are dummy variables indicating whether the firm is managed by an owner (OWNER) or
whether it is a corporation (CORP). A firm managed by a hired manager is more likely
to leave better detailed and informative hard information for communications between the
owner and the manager. Corporations are required to have higher standard of accounting
records.
The dummy variable indicating whether its sales region stretches nation wide (NA-
TIONAL) is also included. In addition such continuous variables as the number of branches
(BRANCH), owner experience (C_EXP), owner age (C_OAGE) and firm’s age (C_FAGE)
are included as independent variables. They are all meant to measure the firm’s trans-
parency and public recognition. The geographical expansion of the firm, an older owner
with longer experience, and a longer firm history all tend to make the firm more recognized
by the general public.24
Demographic variables such as the industry, the geographic location, and the ethnic origin
are included to control the firm’s other fixed characteristics. A complete set of independent
variables and their explanations are listed in Table 3.
4 Results
4.1 Estimation results
Comparison of models and parameter estimates
In conducting the empirical analysis firms whose answers on questionnaires concerning
recent loan applications and trade credit applications were questionable are dropped. Firms
that report holding zero gross assets are not likely to be reflecting their true balance sheets,
and therefore, are dropped. 3477 firms remain in the sample.
Table 4 shows the parameter estimates and the maximized log likelihoods of three es-
although it has the informative written records. If this is true for large number of firms that did not use
written records, RECORD may have little economic meaning.
24CORP captures the firm’s transparency besides availability of written records since corporations are
required to maintain a higher standard of disclosure.
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timated models. The data support the sequential structure of the firm’s decision making.
The general log likelihood principle proposed by Vuong (1989) shows that the nested logit
model is superior to the multinomial logit model but is statistically equivalent to the nested
multinomial logit model.25 Table 5 shows the marginal effects of variables on the conditional
probabilities of choosing a source of external credit for three models. Both point estimates
and standard errors appear to be independent of the choice of a model. Therefore our further
discussion will be based on the results of the most general nested logit model. Many of the
coefficients for variables that are meant to capture the availability of the firm’s information
and its transparency are estimated relatively accurately, supporting the choice of variables.
Among 27 coefficients that represent the first nine elements of coefficient vectors for three
choices of external credit source, 13 are statistically significant. In particular, coefficients
on CORP and BRANCH are significant across all the alternatives.26 27 28
Table 5 presents the marginal effects of individual variables on the firm’s unconditional
probabilities of financial choices and conditional probabilities of choices of external credits
(Panel A). In order to show that results are robust across the models, marginal effects
on conditional probabilities computed with multinomial logit and nested multinomial logit
models are attached (Panel B). Table 6 presents the average, taken from observations,
of levels of unconditional probabilities for each financial choice (Panel A) and conditional
probabilities for each choice of external credit source (Panel B) when each dummy variable
indicated as the title of column entries is held constant either at 0 or at 1 across observations,
and other variables are kept at the original observed values. 29 The rest of this subsection
presents our empirical findings in Tables 5 and 6 and supplemental figures for continuous
25The nested logit model nests the multinomial logit model, whereas the nested logit model and the nested
multinomial logit models are strictly non-nested. Under Vuong’s framework, the standard likelihood ratio
statistic (15.8196), which follows the chi-square distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, selects the nested logit
model over the multinomial logit model at the 1 percent significance level. In contrast, the standardized log
likelihood ratio test statistic (0.8432), which follows the standard normal distribution, does not distinguish
the nested logit model from the nested multinomial logit model at the 10 percent significance level.
26Dummy variables PCFMAN and RECORD are only two variables that measure the secular informational
characteristics.
27Some of such variables may capture not only the informational characteristics but other effects. For
instance the firm’s legal status and branching may capture its endogenous management strategy rather than
fixed effect characteristics.
28The point estimate of the correlation parameter ρ is negative and statistically significant. It is hard to
interpret the negative estimate of ρ since it normally takes the value in the range from 0 (perfect correlation)
to 1 (no correlation, multinomial logit). The negative ρ, however, is not ruled out in the econometric theory.
The estimate of ρ may not be so reliable. Indeed the estimate of the model which assumes α = 1 but keeps ρ
as a free parameter results in the positive and statistically insignificant ρ. We find that results on estimated
probabilities and marginal effects are robust to such model assumptions.
29For each dummy variable, a number in one of the cells in Table 5 is equal to a number in the corresponding
cell in the second panel (a dummy variable is held at 1) of Table 6 less a number in the corresponding cell
in the first panel (a dummy variable is held at 0) of Table 6.
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variables.
Availability of the firm’s hard information
As we will detail below, our empirical findings on the relationship between the availability
of the recorded information on small firms and their credit demand are summarized in three
main points. First, these firms whose accounting and management information are thought
to be better kept are more likely to seek some form of external credit than those firms whose
information is poorly recorded. Second, firms with poor written records start with institu-
tional borrowing, and add trade credit as their second choice of financing as their records
become better organized. Third, the empirical results from the dummy variable PCFMAN
shows the clearest evidences, whereas the results from other variables are supportive of the
findings from PCFMAN.
Direct measures (PCFMAN, RECORD)
The probability that firms using computers for accounting (firms with PCFMAN=1)
apply for some external credit is 82.3 percent, whereas the probability that firms without
computer assistance (PCFMAN=0) apply to it is only 72.1 percent. That is, use of comput-
ers for accounting increases the firm’s demand of external credit by 10.2 percentage points.30
Such firms are 4.3 percent more likely to choose trade credit only (34.8 percent for the firms
not using computers for accounting as opposed to 39.1 percent for firms without them. For
any dummy variable to be mentioned, the first percentage is the probability of each choice
for the less transparent firm and the second one is that for the more transparent firm implied
by the variable, unless noted otherwise), 9.0 percentage points more likely (23.9 percent, 32.9
percent) to apply to both lending and trade credit, and 3.1 percentage points less likely (13.3
percent, 10.3 percent) to choose lending only. All of these effects are statistically significant.
Thus, introduction of computers for managing accounting raises the unconditional likelihood
of applying to trade credit, exclusive use of not, by 13.3 percentage points. On the other
hand, it raises the likelihood of applying for institutional lending only by 5.9 percentage
points.
Indeed the shift from institutional borrowing to trade credit is the shift from demand of
institutional lending to demand of trade credit besides lending. Conditional on the firm’s
need of external credit, the probability that the firm applies only to lending falls by 7.0
percentage points (20.0 percent,13.0 percent) and the probability that it applies both to
lending and trade credit rises by 7.2 percentage points (32.1 percent, 39.3 percent) as the
firm introduces computers for accounting. Both effects are statistically significant at the 1
30Note that reported figures for marginal effects are point estimates. They accompany standard errors.
Thus these figures are merely expectations (averages) over randomization based on the empirical distribution
of model parameters and not deterministic.
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percent level. 31 The total likelihood of choosing trade credit, exclusive use or not, increases
by 7.0 percentage points (80.0 percent, 87.0 percent). In contrast, the total probability to
choose lending barely increases.
The findings on the influence of RECORD on the firm’s financing requests are consistent
with the findings for PCFMAN. On average, firms using written records to answer the
survey are more likely to apply to external credit than firms answering the survey without
them, and are more likely to apply for both institutional lending and trade credit. The
marginal effect on the unconditional probability that the firm applies to lending only and
the effect on the probability that it applies to trade credit only is negligible. Regarding
the chances that firms in need of credit choose one of the three alternatives, firms answering
the survey with some kind of written records are less likely to choose lending only and more
likely to choose the mix of lending and trade credit. None of the reported marginal effects,
however, are significant.
Indirect measures
Firms managed by an employee (OWNER=0) are 4.7 percentage points more likely to
apply for external credit than owner managed firms (78.5 percent, 83.1 percent) and the
effect is significant. Employee managed firms are more likely to apply for trade credit only,
more likely to apply for both trade credit and lending, and less likely to apply for lending
only, though none of these effects is significant. The unconditional probability of applying
to trade credit rises by 8.0 percent (74.9 percent, 67.0 percent) as the owner managed firm
hands its management over to a hired manager. As for the conditional probabilities of the
choice of a financial source, the owner managed firm is 5.4 percentage points more likely
to choose lending only than the employee managed firm by 5.4 percent (15.7 percent, 10.4
percent, significant at the 10 percent significance level) and is less likely to choose the other
two alternatives.
Corporations (CORP=1) are 7.1 percentage points more likely to apply for some external
credit than non-corporations (15.5 percent, 22.6 percent), and 5.1 percent points more likely
to apply to both trade credit and institutional lending (29.0 percent, 34.1 percent). These
effects are statistically significant. The unconditional likelihood that the corporation chooses
trade credit only is higher than the likelihood that a non-corporation chooses one, but the
difference in likelihoods between two types of firms, 2.9 percent, is small and not significant.
The (unconditional) marginal effect on the choice of lending only is insignificant but negative.
As for the marginal effects on the conditional probabilities when the firm needs credit, a
corporation is more likely to choose the mix of lending and trade credit and less likely to
31Two effects almost cancel each other out and leave little room for the likelihood change of applying for
trade credit only. Marginal effects for alternatives are summed up to 0 since corresponding probabilities are
summed up to 1.
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choose lending only than a non-corporation. (Neither of the marginal effects is significant.
The conditional likelihood of choosing trade credit only remains unchanged across different
types of legal entities.
The firm’s public recognition
More branches encourage the firm to attempt to give up self-reliance and to seek trade
credit, supporting the evidence from examining variables on availability of the firm’s hard
information. In contrast, older firms, firms owned by more experienced or older owners, are
not necessarily more likely to seek external credits than otherwise. Such time factors tend
to induce firms to shift from lending only to trade credit only rather than to mix both types
of borrowing.
Marginal effects of the increased number of branches on unconditional probabilities are
negative and significant for a choice of no application to any external credit, and positive and
significant for choices of trade credit only and the mix of trade credit and lending. However,
the only conditional choice on which the marginal effect of marginal increase in the number
of branches is statistically significant is a positive effect on the choice of the mix of lending
and trade credit. The marginal effect on the conditional probability of choosing lending only
is negative but not significant. The effect for the choice of trade credit only is negligible.
As the number of branches increases, dependence on internal funds vanishes and is replaced
by demand of the mix of trade credit and institutional lending (Figure 4). Very few firms
(1.9 percent) at the top 99 percentile of the number of branches (at least 11 branches) are
estimated to refrain from the external credit voluntarily, whereas nearly half of them (44.0
percent) are estimated to apply both for trade credit and lending institutions. In contrast,
the corresponding figures are 22.5 percent and 29.2 percent for firms with only one site of
business.32 33
Marginal effects of operating nation wide as opposed to operating locally on both con-
ditional and unconditional probabilities are positive for lending only and negative for trade
credit only. These effects, however, are not significant. A possible explanation for this
is that the variable NATIONAL captures the geographical network of lenders rather than
the firm’s characteristics. While financial lending institutions represented by banks have
relatively large geographical networks and are able to satisfy the financial needs of firms ex-
panding their sales channels nationwide, supplier firms providing trade credit to small firms,
whose trade partners, many of whom are also likely to be small firms with small numbers of
business sites, are less likely to match their financial needs.
32Firms operating only a single branch are the dominant majority and constitute 79 percent in the sample.
33Indeed the unconditional probability of applying only for trade credit keeps increasing in the number of
branches until it reaches11, and then starts to decrease. Ninety nine percent of firms, however, have less
than 12 branches. The negative relationship does not alter the course of the discussion.
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Figure 5 shows the estimated relationship between the owner experience and the firm’s
financial choice. The more experienced owner demands external credit (the relationship
is not statistically significant). Figures on the unconditional and conditional probabilities
consistently show that the more experienced owner is more likely to choose trade credit only
and less likely to choose lending only. The likelihood that the least experienced owner (in
the first year of his business career) is dependent solely on institutional lending is substantial
(21.2 percent). In contrast, the owner’s thirty-year experience in the small business reduces
the likelihood by almost half. The decline in bank dependence is almost replaced by the
rise in dependence on trade credit (42.8 percent to 50.6 percent).34
Figure 6 shows the estimated relationship between the firm’s age and the firm’s financial
choice. The marginal effect of the firm age on the unconditional probability of being self
reliant for its financing is negligible. On the other hand, younger firms are more likely to
choose institutional lending and older firms are more likely to be dependent on trade credit.
For instance thirty-years of staying in business increases the likelihood that the firm chooses
trade credit only from 40.9 percent to 55.1 percent, reduces the likelihood that it chooses
lending only from 17.6 percent to 12.0 percent and the likelihood that it chooses the mix of
lending and trade credit from 41.4 percent to 32.9 percent
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the owner age and the firm’s financial choice.
Unconditionally the firm is more likely to withdraw from external credit and less likely to
apply to lending institutions as the owner ages. All effects but that for trade credit only
are significant. 35 The likelihoods that a forty year old owner chooses to be self-reliant,
chooses lending only, lending and trade credit, and trade credit only are 17.6 percent, 12.7
percent, 32.5 percent, and 37.2 percent, respectively. Corresponding figures for 60 year old
are 24.1 percent, 9.2 percent, 28.3 percent, and 38.4 percent. The effect on the conditional
likelihood of choosing trade credit is positive and significant, but effects of the other two
alternatives are negative but not statistically significant.
The firm’s demography and its financial choice
Firms whose owner has advanced degrees (degree granting college or higher) are more
likely to choose trade credit and less likely to choose lending only than firms owned by the
less educated. Minority owners are more likely to choose institutional lending and less
likely to be either exclusively dependent on trade credit or to be self-financed (no demand
for external credit). Female owners are less likely to seek external credit. They are likely
34Owners with 30 year experience of doing business are at the top 86.3 percentile of the sample. The
median of owner experience is 18 years. Thirty year old firms are at the top 91.4 percentile and the median
firm age is 11 years.
35This may indicate that the terms of borrowing contracts in general are unfavorable to older individuals.
Interest rates charged may also be higher. Faced with only expensive credits are available, they would
choose to be self-financed.
18
to choose lending only over other financing alternatives if they consider applying for some
external credit. Family owned firms are less likely to seek external credit than non-family
owned firms.
None of the region dummies except a few entries are statistically significant. The esti-
mated marginal effects of these dummy variables are not small, but accompanying standard
errors are large.36 None of industry dummies are statistically significant.37
4.2 Discussion
The firm’s information availability and its financial choice
Records of the firm’s accounting and management may not be publicly available but
lenders may have access to them upon their request to the borrowing firm. Firms whose
information is poorly recorded are more likely to choose institutional lending than those
with better records and less likely to choose trade credit. In contrast firms that record hard
information are unlikely to be bank dependent, and more likely to attempt to borrow from
both banks and supplier firms.
Such findings are consistent with the view that specialist lenders can obtain information
about borrowers from undocumented sources. Such lenders are equipped with the expertise
for handling information, and are able to obtain the information of borrowing firms not only
through written documents or electronic documents recorded and kept by firms but also
through less formal measures such as meetings, phone conversations, and on site inspections
of the borrowers’ production facilities, operating sales sites, and so on. Specialist lenders,
then, process such soft information to assess the viability of borrowers. In other words,
specialist lenders are able to read between the lines of written documents with their special
monitoring technology and can offer the cheap credits to informationally opaque firms.
Unlike specialist lenders, non-specialist lenders, represented by good supplying firms
that allow buyers late payments, are less likely to possess such expertise. However, daily
36The estimated marginal effects on the unconditional likelihood as well as on the likelihood conditional
on the firm’s demand of credit imply that firms in East North Central are more likely to choose lending only
than firms elsewhere. The estimated marginal effect on the unconditional likelihood for firms in West South
Central is negative and statistically significant . These effects, however, are only statistically significant at
the 10 percent significance level.
37There are several large point estimates of marginal effects that draw our attention. The results on both
unconditional and conditional probabilities suggest that firms in construction and manufacturing industries
are more likely to use trade credit (a large positive sum of entries for trade credit and the mix of lending
and trade credit), and that those in communication and transportation, and finance industries are less likely
to use trade credit (a large negative sum of entries for trade credit and the mix of lending and trade credit).
Results on conditional probabilities of choosing a financial alternative suggest that firms in construction and
manufacturing are less likely to choose lending only, and that those in communication and transportation,
and finance industries are more likely to choose lending only.
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transactions and delivery of goods and services may allow them for as close relationships
with borrowing firms as specialist lenders. They can exert leverage on a borrowing buyer
by threatening to cut off the future supply of goods and services if they ever detect a bad
signal from a borrower. 38 Yet, our findings imply that such supplier firms perhaps lack the
ability to collect and process unrecorded soft information from borrowers. Thus they do not
offer cheap trade credit to firms opaque to them. As a result the optimal choice for firms
with poor management and accounting records is to seek cheaper institutional borrowing.
There are three possible reasons why firms do not switch entirely to trade credit but to
seek to add trade credit as an adjunct to institutional borrowing. First, the theory discussed
in Section 2 does not necessarily prove that the funds provided to firms with a higher quality
of recorded information by a superior monitor is cheaper than those provided to such firms
by a poor monitor. Firms may have an incentive to reduce their interest rate risks by
borrowing from two sources. Second, institutional borrowing could involve the substantial
fixed transaction costs for a borrower firm. Giving up bank loans entirely would waste the
firm’s investment of such costs. Third, many firms’ motives for using trade credit are not
restricted to the financial. For instance they may use trade credit to smooth transactions
by reducing the number of bills paid.39 In this case firms choosing trade credit only could
constitute a group of such firms with non-financial motives.
Less publicly recognized firms, young firms with few branches, are also less likely to
choose bank lending over trade credit, supporting our findings concerning the availability of
the firm’s private information to lenders. These findings are consistent with the findings
of Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1997) that costs of institutional lenders fall as a firm ages.
Our findings show that the direct and indirect costs of trade credit, which is provided by a
non-specialist, is more sensitive to a firm’s age than is the institutional lending.
Interpreting measures of general public recognition needs caution. First and most im-
portantly, it is availability and accuracy of information to the lenders per se that matters
in determining the terms of the lending contract. Second, the owner’s business experience
and the firm’s age may involve the classical sample selection bias, and capture not only the
firm’s public recognition but also the talents and performance of the firm and its owner.
A long business history could mean that the firm has outperformed its market competitors
year after year. Alternatively, it could imply that the firm has lagged behind other firms
that have grown much faster and become large entities. Third, younger firms are likely to
demand longer-term credits (institutional borrowing) for financing setup costs.40
38Such bargaining power could be the reason that supplier firms can act as non-specialist intermediaries.
See the discussion in Petersen and Rajan (1997).
39Elliehausen and Wolken (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1997), and Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) provide
non-financial motives of use of trade credit.
40Public recognition seems to encourage a firm to switch from bank dependence to exclusive trade credit
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Inventory management and trade credit
Large but statistically insignificant industry effects on use of trade credit are observed
in the positive effects of construction and manufacturing industries and the negative effects
of communication and transportation, and the finance industries. Trade credit serves as a
device for supplier firm to manage its inventories efficiently. A supplier may offer trade credit
on sales of goods beyond its warehousing capacity to customers that have a better ability to
carry them.41 Manufacturing firms usually have large warehouses for intermediate and final
goods. Likewise construction companies have a large quantity of equipment, machinery, and
building materials to store. Thus these industries are more likely to buy intermediate and
final goods through trade credit arrangements. That there is no recognizable effect on the
services industry is not inconsistent with its limited ability for storing materials.
Some caveats
There is the potential that independent variables are not exogenous and cause a simul-
taneity bias. Suppose there are two lenders, an institutional lender and a goods (services)
supplier firm to the borrowing firm. If one of them required the borrowing firm to submit
its accounting records or the business plans, the borrowing firm, which previously had not
used computers for accounting would now have an incentive to utilize its computer resources
or buy new ones for keeping up and organizing its accounting. Then the marginal effect of
PCFMAN on the likelihood of choosing the lender requesting such documents conditional on
the firm’s need for external credit would be biased upwardly. Similarly if the borrowing firm
needed the well organized bookkeeping for repaying to specifically one of two, the marginal
effect on the conditional likelihood of choosing the lender would be biased upwardly again.
However, such a bias would be likely only to underestimate our findings. Trade a credit
providing supplier firm, a lender of short-term credit, is less likely to require the submission of
specific documents on the borrower firm’s accounting or management.42 On the other hand,
an institutional lender as a provider of longer term credit would request such documents from
a borrower more frequently than a trade credit providing firm. As for the firm’s voluntary
use of computers for planned repayments, the longer term loans would require more detailed
planning and involve more complicated calculations than trade credit. This implies that
correcting biases, if there were any, would reinforce our conclusions even more.
Timings of institutional borrowing vary across the three year period prior to the date
of polling of the firms, whereas timings of trade credit contracts span the one year period
financing rather than mixing its demand for both. This may reflect firms’ preference change on length of
finance.
41See discussions in Emery (1987), Petersen and Rajan (1997) and Choi and Kim (2003).
42The firm would simply use the generic rating services such as Dun & Bradstreet credit scoring if necessary.
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prior to the date of inquiries.43 On the other hand, the survey questions the firm’s current
informational characteristics at the date of inquiries. Thus, unfortunately, independent
variables are not predetermined. It would be idealistic if the data on the availability of the
firm’s information before the three-year period prior to the date of inquires for each firm
were available to us so that independent variables could be predetermined.
This, however, does not cause a serious problem. The constructed dependent variable
collects applications to the same type of credit source into a single group, and captures the
static (structural) preference of the firm. The construction of the variable does not take
into account the frequency of applications for each type of credit source. Therefore, in the
empirical exercise, we are examining the structural relationship between static properties of
the firm, implying that the timing of events is of little relevance.
PCFMAN is one of the few independent variables that could capture the timing of an
event as well as static characteristics. As for this variable, it is the timing of the firm’s
introduction of computers for accounting purposes that is relevant to the claim. If the firm
had introduced them later than the firm’s most recent application from each source, the
variable would be indeed predetermined. However, even if it is a late user of computers for
bookkeeping, such a firm is likely to have kept better accounting records with low technology
methods including hard copies of well organized and detailed books and timely accounting
statements. The firm that uses computers just for online shopping, emailing, and web
surfing at the time of the survey (1999-2000) is less likely to have kept better records than
the firm with some level of computerized accounting system. In other words, PCFMAN
is not only the direct measure of the availability of the firm’s records but also the indirect
measure of the more general stance of the firm on recording information.
5 Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper is to present the empirical findings from the 1998 Survey
of Small Business Finances that the availability of private and public information on the
borrower firm and other informational characteristics of the firm leads to diverse borrowing
patterns among borrower firms.
Small firms often portrayed as being exclusively bank dependent in fact also use trade
credit as a source of external credit. The share of external credit in small business finance
is as dominant as institutional loans. Though term structures of the two forms of finance
differ, use of trade credit leaves the average balance in the firm’s balance sheet just as using
43A date of survey for each firm varies in the two year period from 1999 to 2000. Therefore, a timing of
an attempted institutional borrowing covered ranges from 1996 to 2000. Likewise a timing of an attempted
trade credit contract ranges from 1998 to 2000.
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an institutional lender would. As a total financial management, the firm makes a choice
between institutional borrowing and trade credit.
Institutional lenders are specialized in financial services whereas trade credit providing
firms play a dual role of non-financial service provider and lending service provider. There-
fore, theoretically, institutional lenders, who are specialist lenders, emerge only when they are
substantially more efficient in monitoring and assessing the viability of borrower firms than
non-financial firms granting trade credit. Whether the firm that do not allow that recorded
accounting and management information be made available to lenders chooses institutional
borrowing or trade credit is an empirical question.
We explored a family of probabilistic logit models to characterize the firms’ choice of
a financial source. Constructing the four state dependent variable that indicates whether
firms applied to external credit or not, and if it did whether the source is trade credit,
institutional lending, or both of them, we then estimated how the availability of private
and public information about the firm to lenders affects the likelihood, particularly the
likelihood conditional on the firm’s need for credit, that the firm would choose each credit
source. Use of the data on the firms’ applications, which include denied loans, allowed us
to identify borrowing demand. We paid special attention to the variable PCFMAN, the
dummy variable indicating whether the firm employs computers for accounting or not, which
is based on the new questionnaires that appear for the first time in the 1998 version of the
SSBF. The variable overcomes the shortcomings of other preexisting variables.
We find that firms whose information is poorly recorded, or that are publicly less recog-
nized, are more likely to choose institutional lending over trade credit. As recorded infor-
mation is better organized and firms become more transparent, they tend to switch to a
greater use of trade credit besides institutional loans. This finding is robust across various
measures of availability of information to lenders. Our empirical findings are consistent with
the classical hypothesis which claims that institutional lenders are capable of auditing bor-
rowers regardless of the availability of the recorded information. Firms with better private
recorded information tend to keep using bank lending as well as further use of trade credit
rather than switching entirely to trade credit.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics on the variables used to construct the dependent variable 
 
                   
  Voluntary withdrawal    Approval of applications 
  Yes No    always not always none 
487 2046  1 363 0 67zero 
63.0 75.5    38.3 0.0 7.1
114 318  2 127 32 35once 
14.8 12.8    13.4 3.4 3.7
172 347  3 76 15 25
Frequency 
of applying 
new loans 
more than 
once 22.3 11.7    8.0 1.6 2.6
 773 2711  > 3 142 34 58
 
total 
  22.2 77.8  
Number of 
applications 
for new 
loans 
  15.0 3.6 6.1
      708 81 160
      
total 
  74.6 8.5 16.9
 
 
 
 
 
  Applications    Trade credit denied
  approved denied    yes no 
395 108  yes 172 2147commercial 
bank 50.1 44.8    5.0 61.8
159 49  no 34 1124savings 
bank 20.2 20.3  
Use of trade 
credit 
  1.0 32.3
126 32   total 206 3271S&L 
16.0 13.3     5.9 94.1
44 25      credit union 
5.6 10.4      
65 27      
Institutions 
non-bank 
8.2 11.2      
 total 789 241      
 
 
 
 
Top entries are frequencies.  Bottom entries are
proportions to the entire sample size. 
Top entries are frequencies.  Bottom entries are
proportions to the column total. 
Top entries are frequencies.  Bottom entries are 
proportions to the entire sample size. 
Top entries are frequencies.  Bottom entries for
individual items are proportions to the column
total, and those for “Total” are proportions to the
entire sample size.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of information related independent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 List of independent variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 Value   
  1 0    mean median Mode 
top 90 
percentile
standard 
deviation
RECORD 2732 745  BRANCH 1.65 1 1 2 2.62
 78.6 21.4  C_EXP 19.29 18 20 35 11.75
PCFMAN 2421 1056  C_OAGE 50.76 50 55 66 11.25
 69.6 30.4  C_FAGE 14.52 11 3 29 12.14
CORP 849 2628        
 24.4 75.6        
NATIONAL 549 2928        
  15.8 84.2        
   
Variable types Variables Description 
RECORD Use of written records to answer the survey 
PCFMAN Use of computers for accounting 
OWNER Managed by owner 
Availability of 
private 
information 
CORP Corporation 
NATIONAL Operating nationwide Geographical 
expansion BRANCH The number of branches 
C_EXP Owner's managerial experiences 
C_FAGE Firm age Age 
C_OAGE Owner age 
EDUC Owner's education 
MINORITY Minority owned 
FEMALE Female owned Demography 
FAMILY Family owned 
Mid Atlantic   
East N Central 
West N Central 
South Atlantic 
East S Central 
West S Central 
Mountain  
Region 
dummies 
Pacific   
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Communication/transportation 
Wholesale  
Retail  
Finance  
Industry 
dummies 
Services   
Top entries are frequencies.
Bottom entries are proportions to
the entire sample. 
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Table 4 Panel A Parameter estimates (Nested logit and multinomial logit models) 
                  
  Nested logit  Multinomial logit 
  j=1 j=2 j=3   j=1 j=2 j=3 
 0.1607   0.0474   0.3278*    0.1717    0.2416*    0.0084 RECORD (use of written record) 
(0.1288) (0.1519) (0.1962  (0.1156) (0.1242) (0.1499)
0.6116***   0.3074 1.3143***  0.6530*** 0.8625***    0.1972 PCFMAN (computer use for accounting) 
(0.1212) (0.1951) (0.3220)  (0.1083) (0.1174) (0.1415)
-0.2494 -0.1624   -0.9877**     -0.3759**     -0.3816**    0.2833 OWNER (managed by owner) 
(0.1870) (0.2123) (0.4336)  (0.1755) (0.1834) (0.2772)
0.5009***    0.3599**  0.8146  0.4993*** 0.5981***    0.2665 CORP (corporation) 
(0.1392) (0.1606) (0.2604)  (0.1303) (0.1355) (0.1814)
 0.1304  0.0714 -0.3081    -0.0662 -0.0045    0.2495 NATIONAL (nationally operating) 
(0.1719) (0.1775) (0.2694)  (0.1518) (0.1558) (0.1903)
0.2581*** 0.2232*** 0.3148***  0.2494*** 0.2721*** 0.2113***BRANCH (number of branches) 
(0.0585) (0.0603) (0.0795)  (0.0589) (0.0591) (0.0658)
 0.0032  0.0089    0.0466**       0.0157**      0.0138**   -0.0058C_EXP (owner experience) 
(0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0204)  (0.0065) (0.0070) (0.0093)
  -0.0182**  0.0083 0.0177     0.0009 -0.0163*** -0.0241***C_FAGE (firm age) 
(0.0071) (0.0096) (0.0152)  (0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0090)
-0.0312***   -0.0177** -0.0046  -0.0164*** -0.0252*** -0.0299***C_OAGE (owner age) 
(0.0079) (0.0076) (0.0128)  (0.0059) (0.0063) (0.0077)
   -0.2975** -0.0934  0.2716     0.0039  -0.1356 -0.3847***EDUC (owner higher education) 
(0.1346) (0.1254) (0.2321)  (0.1036) (0.1095) (0.1382)
0.6347***   0.1173 -0.0533    0.0223 0.4071*** 0.5826***MINORITY (minority owner) 
(0.2148) (0.1836) (0.2380)  (0.1468) (0.1478) (0.1685)
-0.1711  -0.1401 -0.6054***  -0.3058*** -0.3385***   -0.0475FEMALE (female owner) 
(0.1294) (0.1455) (0.2240)  (0.1107) (0.1176) (0.1410)
  -0.4638**  -0.2211 -0.4595      -0.2971** -0.4650***   -0.2465FAMILY (family owned) 
(0.1782) (0.1871) (0.2643)  (0.1602) (0.1634) (0.2118)
-0.2889  -0.5244 -0.1094   -0.3616  -0.2037   -0.4895Mid Atlantic 
(0.3096) (0.3525) (0.4826)  (0.2866) (0.3036) (0.3775)
  -0.5300**  -0.3347  0.4536  -0.2111 -0.2855     -0.8156**East N Central 
(0.3176) (0.3431) (0.5880)  (0.2845) (0.3031) (0.3862)
-0.4624  -0.4362 -0.3256  -0.3856 -0.4454   -0.4957West N Central 
(0.3295) (0.3685) (0.5005)  (0.3043) (0.3245) (0.3988)
-0.2685  -0.3957 -0.2615  -0.3147 -0.2734   -0.4255South Atlantic 
(0.3014) (0.3357) (0.4498)  (0.2780) (0.2951) (0.3614)
-0.5540  -0.5900 -0.0613  -0.4498 -0.3998   -0.8585*East S Central 
(0.3451) (0.3877) (0.5832)  (0.3195) (0.3401) (0.4448)
-0.1417  -0.4499  -0.9218*    -0.5922** -0.3922   -0.0597West S Central 
(0.3365) (0.3543) (0.4995)  (0.2941) (0.3107) (0.3704)
-0.0929  -0.3890 -0.3866  -0.3605 -0.1233   -0.0950Mountain 
(0.3483) (0.3820) (0.5075)  (0.3195) (0.3352) (0.4069)
-0.3923  -0.4542 -0.7260   -0.4984* -0.4806   -0.3562
 β’s 
Pacific 
(0.2986) (0.3302) (0.4533)   (0.2743) (0.2914) (0.3534)
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    Nested logit   Multinomial logit 
  j=1 j=2 j=3   j=1 j=2 j=3 
  0.3459   0.2196   1.7424    0.7256   0.5686  -0.6068Construction 
(0.9707) (1.0206) (1.4127)  (0.9113) (0.9086) (1.0737)
  0.4200   0.3075   1.5851    0.7146   0.5711  -0.4039Manufacturing 
(0.9706) (1.0168) (1.3928)  (0.9119) (0.9090) (1.0729)
 -0.1758  -0.7457  -1.3744   -0.9555  -0.7189  -0.2369Communication/transportation 
(1.0181) (1.0283) (1.3548)  (0.9297) (0.9206) (1.0713)
 -0.1718   0.1332   0.2567    0.2670  -0.1456  -0.4184Wholesale 
(0.9743) (1.0169) (1.3322)  (0.9141) (0.9129) (1.0719)
 -0.2662   0.1067   0.5083   0.3386  -0.1440  -0.6010Retail 
(0.9613) (1.0006) (1.3099)  (0.9005) (0.8983) (1.0504)
 -1.0095  -0.3165  -2.3693    -0.9573  -1.6460*  -0.5211Finance 
(0.9767) (1.0699) (1.4404)  (0.9110) (0.9153) (1.0586)
 -0.6417  -0.2980  -0.5832    -0.2569  -0.7256  -0.6258Services 
(0.9556) (0.9967) (1.2971)  (0.8964) (0.8936) (1.0427)
  4.1662   3.2854   3.0760     1.1752    1.8882*    1.7691
 β’s 
Constant 
(83.5458) (83.5403) (83.5437)  (1.0065) (1.0144) (1.2050)
 1.7236        a  
(143.9665)       
  -1.4681**        ρ (0.6273)            
Maximized likelihood -4177.3456   -4185.2554 
 
***, **, and * show that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent, the 5 percent, and the 10 percent  level, 
respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The same hold true for coming tables. 
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Table 4 Panel B Parameter estimates (Nested multinomial logit model) 
        
  First stage logit  Second stage multinomial logit 
  j≠1   j=2 j=3 
     0.1602         0.0725      -0.1501 RECORD (use of written record) 
(0.1034)  (0.1083) (0.1466) 
0.6386***           0.2050* -0.4903*** PCFMAN (computer use for accounting)
(0.0962)  (0.1057) (0.1392) 
     -0.3012         -0.0258         0.6085** OWNER (managed by owner) 
(0.1644)  (0.1315) (0.2567) 
0.4994***         0.0973     -0.2337 CORP (corporation) 
(0.1215)  (0.0987) (0.1628) 
      0.0191         0.0534        0.3182* NATIONAL (nationally operating) 
(0.1376)  (0.1227) (0.1759) 
0.2524***         0.0233     -0.0379 BRANCH (number of branches) 
(0.0580)  (0.0146) (0.0356) 
        0.0115**       -0.0028 -0.0256*** C_EXP (owner experience) 
(0.0059)  (0.0060) (0.0092) 
       -0.0070  -0.0178*** -0.0259*** C_FAGE (firm age) 
(0.0049)  (0.0048) (0.0088) 
-0.0217***       -0.0091        -0.0157** C_OAGE (owner age) 
(0.0053)  (0.0056) (0.0077) 
     -0.1171      -0.1418 -0.3984*** EDUC (owner higher education) 
(0.0936)  (0.0909) (0.1312) 
       0.2858**  0.3747*** 0.5309*** MINORITY (minority owner) 
(0.1281)  (0.1283) (0.1617) 
      -0.2596**      -0.0255         0.2889** FEMALE (female owner) 
(0.0983)  (0.1039) (0.1370) 
     -0.3596**     -0.1692      0.0305 FAMILY (family owned) 
(0.1480)  (0.1175) (0.1894) 
  -0.3325      0.1600     -0.1261 Mid Atlantic 
(0.2654)  (0.2334) (0.3410) 
  -0.3253    -0.1002      -0.6491* East N Central 
(0.2650)  (0.2293) (0.3484) 
  -0.4268    -0.0442    -0.1082 West N Central 
(0.2817)  (0.2514) (0.3618) 
  -0.3157     0.0612    -0.0689 South Atlantic 
(0.2582)  (0.2239) (0.3235) 
   -0.4936*     0.0390    -0.3956 East S Central 
(0.2944)  (0.2675) (0.4138) 
  -0.4097     0.2094      0.5555* West S Central 
(0.2702)  (0.2429) (0.3351) 
  -0.2353    0.2270    0.2468 Mountain 
(0.2941)  (0.2572) (0.3652) 
   -0.4693*    0.0302    0.1884 
 β’s 
Pacific 
(0.2544)   (0.2224) (0.3162) 
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    First stage logit  Second stage multinomial logit 
  j≠1   j=2 j=3 
      0.4778       -0.0639      -1.1938Construction 
(0.8184)  (0.7085) (0.9661) 
      0.5091       -0.0582       -0.9964Manufacturing 
(0.8195)  (0.7062) (0.9633) 
      -0.6702        0.3073        0.8041Communication/transportation 
(0.8269)  (0.7346) (0.9751) 
        0.0021       -0.3330       -0.5250Wholesale 
(0.8212)  (0.7127) (0.9640) 
      -0.0006       -0.3960       -0.7907Retail 
(0.8076)  (0.7040) (0.9466) 
      -1.0868       -0.5960        0.6855Finance 
(0.8147)  (0.7305) (0.9621) 
      -0.4992       -0.3765       -0.2353Services 
(0.8034)  (0.7015) (0.9399) 
2.6243***        0.6840       0.7020
 β’s 
Constant 
(0.9063)  (0.7964) (1.0898) 
Maximized likelihood -1630.7325   -2549.5978 
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Table 5 Panel A Marginal effects for the nested logit model 
                  
 Unconditional probabilities  Conditional probabilities 
  
No external 
credit 
Trade credit 
only 
Lending/
Trade credit
Lending 
only 
  Trade credit 
only 
Lending/ 
Trade credit 
Lending 
only 
-2.3578 0.5743     2.5992 -0.8157  -0.5852     2.3314  -1.7462RECORD (use of written record) 
(1.8602) (2.0093) (1.9822)) (1.3564)  (2.3981) (2.3415) (1.8965)
-10.2432***    4.3446** 8.9555***  -3.0569*  -0.2841 7.2413*** -6.9571***PCFMAN (computer use for 
accounting) (2.3365) (2.1494) (2.7434) (1.5706)  (2.4844) (2.3394) (2.2377)
   4.6758*     -3.3592   -4.5946  3.2781  -1.6368 -3.7194     5.3562*OWNER (managed by owner) 
(2.6262) (2.8927) (3.1143) (2.1424)  (3.2239) (3.1644) (2.8317)
-7.0972***   2.9283      5.1183** -0.9494  -0.4392   3.2807  -2.8415CORP (corporation) 
(2.0446) (2.1165) (2.4794) (1.5268)  (2.3066) (2.2783) (1.9777)
-0.3720 -1.7151  -0.3953   2.4825  -2.6228 -0.7628   3.3856NATIONAL (nationally 
operating) (2.3808) (2.3837) (2.5023) (1.7885)  (2.8018) (2.7131) (2.4456)
  -3.8643**    1.6827** 1.8962***   0.2854  -0.1705     0.7386**  -0.5680BRANCH (number of branches) 
(1.8448) (0.7592) (0.6145) (0.4823)  (0.4066) (0.3755) (0.4909)
-0.1948    0.2737**     0.1132    -0.1920**    0.2505*    0.0680    -0.3186**C_EXP (owner experience) 
(0.1282) (0.1237) (0.1212) (0.0976)  (0.1433) (0.1415) (0.1329)
 0.0405 0.3355***      -0.2391** -0.1368  0.4619***     -0.2766**  -0.1853C_FAGE (firm age) 
(0.1017) (0.1051) (0.0996) (0.0855)  (0.1154) (0.1190) (0.1186)
   0.3284**   0.0488    -0.2058*   -0.1714**      0.2717** -0.1124  -0.1592C_OAGE (owner age) 
(0.1647) (0.1215) (0.1142) (0.0799)  (0.1270) (0.1264) (0.1011)
 1.8901   2.7033   -1.5981   -2.9952**      4.8137** -1.0832    -3.7305**EDUC (owner higher education) 
(1.7132) (1.7780) (1.7445) (1.3176)  (2.0542) (2.0343) (1.7510)
  -4.4522**   -5.0594**      6.0276**   3.4840*  -8.9385***   5.3178*  3.6207 MINORITY (minority owner) 
(2.1674) (2.5009) (2.7700) (1.7837)  (2.8453) (2.8855) (2.2378)
   3.7229** -2.7929  -2.8284 1.8984  -1.5530 -2.0843  3.6373* FEMALE (female owner) 
(1.8746) (1.9387) (1.9229) (1.3497)  (2.3173) (2.2642) (1.8734)
    5.3103** -0.0889  -4.9326* -0.2887   2.9069 -3.7588  0.8519 FAMILY (family owned) 
(2.3146) (2.4215) (2.7955) (1.7679)  (2.6983) (2.6886) (2.2970)
 5.5070 -4.3479  1.2956 -2.4546  -2.1248   4.3045 -2.1798 Mid Atlantic 
(4.9956) (4.3614) (4.9023) (2.7385)  (5.2151) (5.3000) (3.9936)
 5.0432   1.8485 -1.8703  -5.0214*   6.1269  0.0094  -6.1363* East N Central 
(5.0130) (4.4615) (4.6423) (2.6289)  (5.2310) (5.1298) (3.6731)
 7.0277 -2.7795 -2.3948 -1.8534   0.8788  0.0767 -0.9554 West N Central 
(5.4719) (4.6185) (4.8558) (2.9185)  (5.6194) (5.5534) (4.3765)
  4.9230 -3.4999 -0.1868 -1.2363  -1.4736 1.9865 -0.5129 South Atlantic 
(4.7504) (4.2097) (4.5726) (2.7728)  (4.9968) (5.0085) (4.0006)
 8.1567 -3.0820 -1.3356 -3.7391   1.4567 2.1853 -3.6420 East S Central 
(5.8913) (4.9259) (5.2132) (2.9706)  (6.0617) (6.0591) (4.5135)
  6.5457   -7.9743* -0.9176  2.3463  -6.9816 1.5656  5.4161 West S Central 
(5.2807) (4.3697) (4.8129) (3.2817)  (5.2904) (5.4534) (4.8866)
  4.0120  -5.3908  1.3112  0.0676  -4.6916 3.4766  1.2151 Mountain (5.4431) (4.7449) (5.4050) (3.2487)  (5.6724) (5.8143) (4.7434)
  7.6032  -5.1093 -2.7773  0.2833  -2.1680 -0.2933 2.4613 Pacific 
(4.8550) (4.1144) (4.3784) (2.8321)  (4.9363) (4.9128) (4.1782)
-6.6174    5.3093   7.2607 -5.9526   2.9331 6.0430 -8.9761 Construction 
(11.4344) (14.3917) (15.8619)) (6.3157)  (16.1572) (15.7630) (7.8334)
-7.2886    5.3621   6.8786 -4.9521   2.5324 5.2676 -7.8000 Manufacturing 
(11.0936) (14.3298) (15.7444) (6.6870)  (16.0262) (15.5851) (8.2162)
10.8532 -12.7962 -1.0416  2.9847  -11.7131 3.4158 8.2973 Communication/transportation 
(16.9037) (12.0126) (14.5462) (9.0796)  (15.4317) (15.7967) (14.5452)
-0.0034    4.1482 -2.6057 -1.5391   5.3986 -3.2070 -2.1916 Wholesale 
(13.7994) (13.5999) (14.1199) (7.8649)  (16.0128) (14.5938) (10.7203)
  0.2431    5.6335 -2.6852 -3.1913   7.6008 -3.1581 -4.4427 Retail 
(13.6683) (13.3761) (14.0479) (7.5743)  (15.7666) (14.5771) (10.2654)
20.4747  -9.3584   -16.2643  5.1480  -1.2649 -15.0697 16.3346Finance 
(18.1010) (11.7498) (10.5895) (9.2745)  (16.5796) (12.2786) (16.4507)
  7.8781 -0.4160 -6.6736 -0.7885   4.2684 -5.0419  0.7735 Services 
(13.7631) (13.1588) (13.8357) (8.2144)  (15.6162) (14.6418) (11.2454)
N 735 1307 1046 389   1307 1046 389
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Table 5 Panel B Marginal effects for multinomial logit and nested multinomial models 
(conditional probabilities) 
                
 Multinomial logit  Nested multinomial logit 
  
Trade credit 
only 
Lending/ 
Trade credit
Lending 
only 
 Trade credit 
only 
Lending/ 
Trade credit 
Lending 
only 
-0.1883     2.4281 -2.2399  -0.3182    2.4173 -2.0991 RECORD (use of written record) 
(2.4192) (2.3437) (1.9426)  (2.4321) (2.3526) (1.9723)
-0.7732 7.1013*** -6.3282***  -0.4910 7.1833*** -6.6922***PCFMAN (computer use for 
accounting) (2.4811) (2.3256) (2.2024)  (2.5087) (2.3442) (2.2806)
-4.0322 -3.5694 7.6016***  -3.3374   -3.7700    7.1074**OWNER (managed by owner) 
(3.2120) (3.1376) (2.7347)  (3.2223) (3.1599) (2.8053)
-0.2512  3.4414 -3.1902  -0.2273    3.4149 -3.1876 CORP (corporation) 
(2.3211) (2.2733) (1.9705)  (2.3286) (2.2830) (2.0023)
-3.0486 -0.2555  3.3041  -2.8996 -0.4663   3.3659NATIONAL (nationally operating) 
(2.7884) (2.6897) (2.4421)  (2.8089) (2.7067) (2.4923)
-0.1543   0.7109* -0.5565  -0.1667 0.7237* -0.5570 BRANCH (number of branches) 
(0.3990) (0.3653) (0.4670)  (0.4023) (0.3701) (0.4777)
 0.1681 0.0688 -0.2369*  0.2064 0.0721 -0.2786** C_EXP (owner experience) 
(0.1368) (0.1338) (0.1218)  (0.1406) (0.1377) (0.1297)
0.4548***  -0.2573** -0.1975*  0.4672*** -0.2639** -0.2034* C_FAGE (firm age) 
(0.1125) (0.1143) (0.1180)  (0.1158) (0.1176) (0.1216)
   0.2371* -0.1279 -0.1092     0.2547** -0.1230 -0.1317 C_OAGE (owner age) 
(0.1239) (0.1222) (0.0958)  (0.1264) (0.1246) (0.1005)
    4.8506** -1.1148 -3.7357*    4.9234** -1.1024    -3.8209**EDUC (owner higher education) 
(2.0924) (2.0582) (1.7763)  (2.0930) (2.0595) (1.8022)
-10.1780***    5.7499**  4.4281*  -9.7676*** 5.6497*    4.1180* MINORITY (minority owner) 
(2.8249) (2.8961) (2.3074)  (2.8385) (2.9015) (2.3105)
-1.0522 -2.0849  3.1372*  -1.3558 -2.0883    3.4441* FEMALE (female owner) 
(2.3276) (2.2529) (1.8684)  (2.3415) (2.2659) (1.9184)
 2.5918 -4.0490 1.4572   2.7298 -3.9664   1.2366FAMILY (family owned) 
(2.7340) (2.6965) (2.2796)  (2.7388) (2.7046) (2.3298)
-1.9339  4.2268 -2.2929  -1.9778 4.2616 -2.2839 Mid Atlantic 
(5.2570) (5.3120) (4.0050)  (5.2719) (5.3297) (4.0744)
 5.0769  1.4786 -6.5554*   5.7649 1.1467 -6.9115 East N Central 
(5.2566) (5.1652) (3.6945)  (5.2772) (5.1691) (3.7427)
 1.7266 -0.7735 -0.9531   1.4358 -0.4280 -1.0078 West N Central 
(5.6537) (5.5187) (4.3970)  (5.6760) (5.5536) (4.4666)
-0.0206  1.5088 -1.4882  -0.6277 1.7385 -1.1108 South Atlantic 
(5.0393) (5.0003) (3.9193)  (5.0503) (5.0228) (4.0188)
 1.6944 3.2616 -4.9560   1.7867 2.9506 -4.7373 East S Central 
(6.1227) (6.1066) (4.3724)  (6.1418) (6.1153) (4.5020)
-6.8030 1.7306 5.0724  -7.0676 1.8001  5.2674 West S Central 
(5.3409) (5.4476) (4.9226)  (5.3518) (5.4768) (5.0123)
-5.7737 3.9612 1.8125  -5.4513 3.8138  1.6375 Mountain 
(5.6988) (5.8633) (4.8589)  (5.7116) (5.8685) (4.8900)
-1.1999      -0.3406 1.5405  -1.6916 -0.3090  2.0006 Pacific 
(4.9805) (4.9131) (4.1156)  (4.9931) (4.9325) (4.2210)
11.0691 3.4158   -14.4849   8.5238 4.8184   -13.3422 Construction 
(16.0683) (15.5633) (7.1498)  (16.2689) (15.7287) (7.5465)
 9.4961 2.6028   -12.0989   7.1990 3.9120   -11.1111 Manufacturing 
(16.0360) (15.4254) (7.5057)  (16.2048) (15.5717) (7.9494)
-8.6019 1.5824 7.0195  -10.3015 2.6996   7.6019Communication/transportation 
(16.1202) (15.5261) (14.4338)  (15.9738) (15.6850) (14.8743)
11.4419 -5.7227 -5.7192    9.0102 -4.7402 -4.2700 Wholesale 
(15.8107) (14.2808) (9.2463)  (16.0944) (14.4613) (10.0712)
14.2482 -5.9738 -8.2744  11.7496 -4.7656 -6.9840 Retail 
(15.3972) (14.3061) (9.4292)  (15.7256) (14.4808) (9.9182)
  9.1966 -17.8019  8.6053   6.0250 -17.0025 10.9775 Finance 
(16.6356) (11.9824) (14.7992)  (16.9450) (12.1073) (15.9690)
10.4325 -8.6412 -1.7913   7.9599 -7.2374 -0.7225 Services 
(15.3232) (14.5377) (11.1428)  (15.6352) (14.6400) (11.3912)
N 1307 1046 389   1307 1046 389
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Table 6 Panel A Unconditional probabilities of financial choice when one dummy variable is held fixed 
                    
 Dummy variable=0  Dummy variable=1 
  
No external 
credits 
Trade credit 
only 
Lending/Trade 
credit 
Lending 
only  
No external 
credits 
Trade credit 
only 
Lending/Trade 
credit 
Lending 
only 
RECORD (use of written record) 22.9445 37.1596 28.0724 11.8235  20.5867 37.7339 30.6717 11.0078
PCFMAN (computer use for accounting) 27.9457 34.7930 23.9425 13.3188  17.7025 39.1376 32.8980 10.2619
Owner (managed by owner) 16.8665 40.6519 34.2903 8.1913  21.5423 37.2926 29.6957 11.4694
CORP (corporation) 22.5901 37.0192 28.9679 11.4229  15.4929 39.9475 34.0862 10.4735
NATIONAL (nationally operating) 21.2034 37.8273 30.1586 10.8106  20.8314 36.1122 29.7633 13.2931
BRANCH (number of branches) - - - -  - - - - 
C_EXP (owner experience) - - - -  - - - - 
C_FAGE (firm age) - - - -  - - - - 
C_OAGE (owner age) - - - -  - - - - 
EDUC (owner higher education) 20.1782 36.1070 30.9830 12.7318  22.0683 38.8103 29.3849 9.7365
MINORITY (minority owner) 21.7990 38.2786 29.3536 10.5688  17.3468 33.2192 35.3812 14.0529
FEMALE (female owner) 20.0429 38.3766 30.9296 10.6509  23.7659 35.5836 28.1012 12.5493
FAMILY (family owned) 16.4700 37.7347 34.3394 11.4559  21.7802 37.6458 29.4068 11.1672
Mid Atlantic 20.5358 38.0859 29.9005 11.4778  26.0428 33.7379 31.1961 9.0232
East N Central 20.5366 37.2495 30.3478 11.8662  25.5798 39.0980 28.4774 6.8448
West N Central 20.6687 37.7441 30.2642 11.3230  27.6964 34.9646 27.8694 9.4695
South Atlantic 20.3866 38.1480 30.0734 11.3920  25.3096 34.6481 29.8866 10.1556
East S Central 20.7319 37.7171 30.1589 11.3921  28.8886 34.6351 28.8232 7.6530
West S Central 20.5054 38.4447 30.1847 10.8652  27.0510 30.4704 29.2671 13.2115
Mountain 20.9225 37.9339 29.9900 11.1536  24.9345 32.5431 31.3012 11.2212
Pacific 19.7503 38.5684 30.6192 11.0621  27.3536 33.4591 27.8420 11.3454
Construction 21.6942 37.0971 29.3166 11.8920  15.0768 42.4064 36.5774 5.9394
Manufacturing 21.7058 37.1545 29.4010 11.7387  14.4172 42.5165 36.2796 6.7867
Communication/transportation 20.7455 38.0683 30.1686 11.0176  31.5987 25.2721 29.1270 14.0022
Wholesale 21.1384 37.2584 30.3152 11.2880  21.1350 41.4065 27.7095 9.7490
Retail 21.1331 36.3642 30.5929 11.9099  21.3761 41.9977 27.9076 8.7185
Finance 19.9887 38.1007 31.1580 10.7527  40.4633 28.7422 14.8937 15.9007
Services 17.7434 37.7870 32.9433 11.5264  25.6215 37.3709 26.2697 10.7379
N 735 1307 1046 389  735 1307 1046 389
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Table 6 Panel B Conditional probabilities of financial choice when one dummy variable is held 
fixed 
          
 Dummy variable=0   Dummy variable=1 
  
Trade credit 
only 
Lending/Trade 
credit 
Lending 
only  
Trade credit 
only 
Lending/Trade 
credit 
Lending 
only 
RECORD (use of written record 48.1415 35.2245 16.6340  47.5563 37.5559 14.8878
PCFMAN (computer use for accounting) 47.9638 32.0512 19.9851  47.6797 39.2924 13.0279
Owner (managed by owner) 49.1842 40.4383 10.3776  47.5474 36.7188 15.7338
CORP (corporation) 47.8625 36.3097 15.8278  47.4234 39.5904 12.9863
NATIONAL (nationally operating) 48.0205 37.1492 14.8303  45.3977 36.3864 18.2159
BRANCH (number of branches) - - -  - - - 
C_EXP (owner experience) - - -  - - - 
C_FAGE (firm age) - - -  - - - 
C_OAGE (owner age) - - -  - - - 
EDUC (owner higher education) 45.1594 37.6614 17.1792  49.9732 36.5782 13.4487
MINORITY (minority owner) 48.9472 36.3988 14.6540  40.0086 41.7166 18.2747
FEMALE (female owner) 48.1361 37.6667 14.1972  46.5830 35.5824 17.8345
FAMILY (family owned) 45.1909 40.2611 14.5480  48.0977 36.5024 15.3999
Mid Atlantic 47.9108 36.5315 15.5576  45.7861 40.8361 13.3779
East N Central 46.8350 37.0870 16.0781  52.9619 37.0963 9.9418
West N Central 47.5819 37.0462 15.3718  48.4607 37.1229 14.4164
South Atlantic 47.9159 36.6978 15.3863  46.4423 38.6844 14.8733
East S Central 47.5663 36.9351 15.4986  49.0230 39.1204 11.8566
West S Central 48.4265 36.9079 14.6656  41.4449 38.4734 20.0817
Mountain 47.9734 36.8183 15.2083  43.2818 40.2948 16.4234
Pacific 48.1263 37.1256 14.7480  45.9584 36.8323 17.2093
Construction 47.3873 36.3854 16.2273  50.3204 42.4284 7.2512
Manufacturing 47.4783 36.4976 16.0241  50.0107 41.7653 8.2241
Communication/transportation 48.1062 36.9338 14.9599  36.3931 40.3497 23.2573
Wholesale 47.2816 37.2887 15.4297  52.6802 34.0817 13.2381
Retail 46.1258 37.6228 16.2515  53.7265 34.4647 11.8088
Finance 47.7276 38.0012 14.2712  46.4627 22.9315 30.6058
Services 45.9520 39.1521 14.8959  50.2204 34.1102 15.6694
N 1307 1046 389   1307 1046 389
 
